Gender
-
Pdf of Introduction and Table of Contents (pre-proof)
Gender Identity: What It Is and Why It Matters is the first book in philosophy focussing on gender identity and transgender rights. To be trans is to have a gender identity different from the gender you were assigned at birth. But what is it to have a gender identity? The first part of the book develops a new account of our gender identities as the genders that seems to us to fit us. This subjective fit account of gender identity fits with trans testimony, explains why gender identities deserve respect, explains how we can discover our gender identity, explains why gender identities are practically important, and provides a good account of both cis and trans and non-binary and binary gender identities. The second part of the book develops a new view of trans rights to gender marker change, legal gender recognition, gender-affirming healthcare, and sporting participation and accommodation. It develops an integrity-based account on which these trans rights arise from basic liberal rights to live with integrity, to live in line with your judgments of how you ought to live, and what a good or meaning life for you involves. Rights to live with integrity ground basic liberal rights to freedom of religious belief and expression. This book argues that they also ground trans rights. The second part of the book also addresses a wide range of gender-critical feminist philosophers’ arguments against trans rights and shows that these arguments fail.
-
Bathroom bills are laws or policies that require trans people to use bathrooms for the gender they were assigned at birth rather than the gender that matches their gender identity. Florida, Kansas, and Texas currently have bathroom bills in place, the UK in all likelihood will soon have such a bill in place. And many other US states have limited bathroom bills in place. Existing philosophical discussion of bathroom bills by gender-critical feminists Lawford-Smith and Stock has argued that bathroom bills are just or morally required. This paper argues that bathroom bills breach trans people’s rights, and these rights are not outweighed by other rights
or other considerations, so bathroom bills are unjust. First, it argues that bathroom bills violate trans people’s rights to public, civic, or social participation without harm. It then argues that idealized bathroom bills, very different from those that have been proposed, enacted, and argued for, that require all public spaces to have a plentiful supply of gender- neutral bathrooms designed for trans people to use would breach trans people’s rights against unjust statistical discrimination. Finally, the paper addresses Lawford-Smith and Stock’s arguments in detail. It shows that these arguments fail to show that bathroom bills are just. -
Recently the UK and many US states have brought in policies and laws that limit or entirely prevent trans adults and/or trans youth’s access to gender-affirming healthcare. These restrictions on trans access to gender-affirming healthcare are justified on paternalistic grounds, that is, on the basis of the benefits to trans youth and trans adults of these restrictions. This paper argues that a state cannot permissibly limit trans people’s access to gender-affirming healthcare on paternalistic grounds. First, the paper constructs and defends a weak anti-paternalist principle (§2). Second, the paper argues that paternalistic restrictions on trans adults accessing gender-affirming healthcare that have been implemented in Florida, Missouri, and the UK fall afoul of this weak anti-paternalist principle (§3-5). Finally, the paper discusses the bans on trans teenagers accessing puberty blockers that have been implemented by 25 US states and the UK. It argues that the combination of (a) extant accounts of when paternalistic restrictions on teenagers accessing X can be justified even though restrictions on adults accessing X cannot be justified and (b) the argument made in the rest of the paper implies that these paternalistic bans on trans teenagers accessing puberty blockers are impermissible.
-
We have basic liberal rights to live and act with integrity; these rights very plausibly ground our rights to freedom of religious belief and expression. I argue that many trans people need to be able to change their gender markers on their legal identification documents in order to live and act with integrity, and because of this, trans people have pro tanto rights to change their gender markers on their legal identification documents (§2). I then argue that: a) there are no rights, harms, or other considerations that outweigh trans and non-binary people’s pro tanto rights to freedom of legal gender identification; b) in virtue of a, blanket bans on gender marker change and surgery requirements on gender marker change are unjust and breach trans and nonbinary people’s all-things-considered rights to freedom of legal gender identification; and c) there is a strong presumption in favour of either the legal decertification of gender or, alternatively, gender self-identification, or similar policies that make it relatively easy for trans people to change their gender markers (§3). Finally, I argue that this integrity-based approach to rights to freedom of legal gender identification is superior to alternative privacy-, autonomy-, and harm-based approaches (§4).
-
This paper proposes a new account of gender identity on which for A to have gender G as part of their gender identity is for A to not take G not to fit them (or to positively take G to fit them). It argues that this subjective fit account of gender identity fits well with trans people’s testimony and both trans and cis people’s experiences of their genders. The subjective fit account also avoids the problems that existing accounts of gender identity face. Existing accounts face broadly two types of problems. First, they seem to imply that trans people have gender identities different from those that they in fact have. For instance, they seem to imply that some trans women do not have a female gender identity or have not always had that gender identity, contrary to their testimony and experiences. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem. Second, many existing accounts of gender identity seem to conflict with the idea that our gender identities merit respect. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem because it understands gender identities to consist in normative experiences and judgments and normative experiences and judgments merit respect.
-
There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of descriptive properties. These similarities give us reason to investigate the idea that, like moral thought and talk, gender thought and talk is inherently normative. This paper proposes a normative account of gender thought and talk in terms of fitting treatment. On this fitting treatment account, to judge that A is gender G is just to judge that it is fitting to treat A as a G. This account is a descriptive or hermeneutical account of our gender thought and talk rather than an ameliorative account of our gender concepts or a metaphysical account of gender properties in social metaphysics. This paper argues that other descriptive accounts of gender thought and talk face problems that the fitting treatment account overcomes.
-
Our gender identity is our sense of ourselves as a woman, a man, as genderqueer, or as another gender. Our gender is the property we have of being a woman, being a man, being non-binary, or being another gender. What is the relationship between our gender identity and our gender? Recently, much work has been done on ameliorative accounts of the gender concepts that we should accept and on the metaphysics of gender properties. From this work 4 views of the relationship between having gender identity G (e.g. having a female gender identity) and being a gender G (e.g. being a woman) have emerged. A first, the no connection view, says that gender identity and gender are entirely distinct; Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative account of gender, as well as Theodore Bach’s account of gender properties, are instances of this view. A second, the gender-identity-first view, says that all there is to our gender is our gender identity; this view is at least similar to views that Talia Bettcher and R.A. Briggs and B.R. George have argued for. A third, contextualist view, says that in some contexts and relative to certain standards, our gender identity determines our gender, and that in others it does not; Ásta and Robin Dembroff have proposed and defended views along these lines. A fourth view, the two gender properties view, says that there are two properties that can make it the case that one is gender G (in any context), one’s having gender identity G and one’s being socially classed as a G; Katharine Jenkins and Elizabeth Barnes have proposed views along these lines. This article explains these 4 different views and spells out their prospects, and the problems they face, as both ameliorative and as metaphysical views.
-
According to the ICD-11 and DSM-5, transgender people’s experienced gender is incongruent with their natal sex or gender and the purpose of gender affirming-healthcare (GAH) interventions is to reduce this incongruence. Vincent and Jane argue that this view is conceptually incoherent—the incoherence thesis—and propose that the ICD and DSM should be revised to understand transgender people as experiencing a merely felt incongruence between their gender and their natal sex or gender—the feelings revision. I argue that (i) Vincent and Jane in fact give us no reason to believe the incoherence thesis and that (ii) we may want to resist the combination of the incoherence thesis and the feelings revision because this combination implies that all transgender people have feelings that are misplaced and are, in an importance sense, incorrect or mistaken. I then give a fit-based account of how trans people’s experienced gender can be incongruent with their natal sex or gender and how GAH can reduce this incongruence.
-
Gender-affirming healthcare interventions are medical or surgical interventions that aim to allow trans and non-binary people to better affirm their gender identity. It has been argued that rights to GAH must be grounded in either a right to be cured of or mitigate an illness—gender dysphoria—or in harm prevention, given the high rates of depression and suicide among trans and non-binary people. However, these grounds of a right to GAH conflict with the prevalent view among theorists, institutions and activists that trans and non-binary people do not have a mental illness and that one can be trans and entitled to GAH without being depressed or suicidal. This paper challenges the orthodoxy that a right to GAH must be grounded in either of these ways and instead argues for a right to GAH grounded in a right to live and act with integrity. The standard view, which this paper explains, is that our rights to live and act with integrity ground a right to religious accommodation in many cases such as a right to not be denied social security due to one’s refusal to work a job on a holy day. This paper argues that if our rights to live and act with integrity can ground prima facie rights to religious accommodation, our rights to live and act with integrity ground prima facie rights to GAH. There are no data in this work.
Normativity
-
Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. I argue that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. I show that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, and I extend the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and ought, in terms of reasons.
-
View pdf pre-print of introduction, ‘Fittingness: A User’s Guide’
This volume explores the nature, roles, and applications of the notion of fittingness in contemporary normative and metanormative philosophy. The fittingness relation is the relation in which a response stands to a feature of the world when that feature merits, or is worthy of, that response. In the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, this normative notion of fittingness played a prominent role in the theories of the period’s most influential ethical theorists, and in recent years has regained prominence, promising to enrich the theoretical resources of contemporary theorists working in the philosophy of normativity. This volume is the first central discussion of the notion to date. It is composed of seventeen new chapters covering a range of topics including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relation(s) between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. In addition to making important contributions to the debates in the philosophy of normativity with which they’re concerned, these chapters together support the hypothesis that notion of fittingness has great theoretical utility in investigating a range of normative matters, across a variety of domains.
-
Some actions are fitting: giving a moving and mournful eulogy at a funeral; the calling out of an overlooked injustice. It was fitting for the Queen of England to pardon Alan Turing; and it is fitting for a healthy young person to let someone with difficulties standing take their seat. Some actions are unfitting: praising someone you know to be evil; laughing during a minute’s silence; a judge’s asserting that a defendant is guilty when they know that they are innocent. But what is it for an action to be fitting or unfitting?
§I discusses existing accounts of fitting action and argues that there are reasons to reject them. §II proposes a new deontic account of fitting actions which it argues can avoid the problems that existing accounts face. §III discusses the implications of the deontic account of fitting action for whether fitting action matters, for whether fitting actions have authoritative normativity, and for whether fittingness comes first, whether it is the most fundamental, or a fundamental, normative property. §IV argues that the deontic account does not face any other insurmountable objections.
-
Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the mafia’s code of omerta, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This paper first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This paper gives a value-based account of which attitudinal standards give rise to genuine normativity. It argues that this account has interesting implications before extending it to provide an account of which action-guiding standards are genuinely normative. It argues that this value-based account of which standards are genuinely normative is more plausible than alternatives suggested in the literature and has interesting implications for genuine normativity in law and aesthetics.
-
It is tempting to think that all of normativity, such as our reasons for action, what we ought to do, and the attitudes that it is fitting for us to have, derives from what is valuable. But value-first approaches to normativity have fallen out of favour as the virtues of reasons- and fittingness-first approaches to normativity have become clear. On these views, value is not explanatorily prior to reasons and fit; rather the value of things is understood in terms of the pro-attitudes it is fitting to have, or that we have reasons to have, towards these things. The value-first accounts of reasons and fit that have been proposed have been direct accounts of reasons and fit. On these views, the fittingness of an attitude is explained in terms of the value of having it or the value of the object of that attitude. This chapter details and surveys these problems, explaining which are yet to be overcome, and explaining which problems direct value-first accounts can overcome. This chapter then explores the prospects of an indirect value-first account of reasons and fit. It argues that it avoids the problems that direct value-first accounts face and may be as explanatorily powerful as fittingness- and reasons-first accounts of value and normativity more generally.
-
I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for prefer- ences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism.
-
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
-
Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their view fail to show that we have good reason to accept good simpliciter skepticism. So, I show that we do not have good reason to accept good simpliciter skepticism
-
Our concepts of good simpliciter, good for, and good as a particular kind of thing must share some common element. I argue that all three types of goodness can be analysed in terms of the reasons that there are for a certain sets of agents to have pro-attitudes. To this end I provide new and compelling accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes that are more explanatorily illuminating than competing accounts and that evade the objections that undermine previous accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons
-
According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the WKR problem can be dissolved. I argue that (A) the view that there are wrong kind of reasons for the pro-attitudes that figure in FA accounts conflicts with the conjunction of (B) an extremely plausible and extremely weak connection between normative and motivating rea- sons and (C) an extremely plausible generality constraint on the reasons for pro- attitudes that figure in FA accounts. I argue that when confronted with this trilemma we should give up (A) rather than (B) or (C) because there is a good explanation of why (A) seems so plausible but is in fact false, but there is no good explanation of why (B) and (C) seem so plausible but are in fact false.
-
In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of reasons for pro-attitudes are reasons that would not still be reasons for pro-attitudes if it were not for the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes
Moral Disagreement
-
Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate? In this guidebook I examine and assesses the following topics and questions: Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers; Metaethics and moral disagreement; Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism; Moral disagreement and normative ethics; Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement; Moral compromise; Moral uncertainty; How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives?
-
This handbook introduces philosophical work on disagreement in epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy, and meta-philosophy.
-
We have controversial intuitions about the rightness of retributive punishment, keeping promises for its own sake, and pushing the heavy man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case. How do these intuitions relate to ethical theories? Should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain them? Or are only uncontroversial intuitions relevant to explanatory ethical theorising? I argue against several views that we might hold about the relationship between controversial intuitions and ethical theories. I then propose and defend the view that ethical theories should only aim to fit with and explain the intuitions that almost all people (who minimally understand the relevant issues) share. I argue that this view has interesting and important implications for ethical theorising and theorising about justice and equality.
-
Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of. And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that holds.
-
This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions.
-
This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral beliefs. The first is whether there is an asymmetry between the implications of conciliationism for the epistemic status of our moral beliefs and the implications of conciliationism for the epistemic status of our non-moral beliefs; for instance, some have argued that conciliationism leads to epistemological moral skepticism but not to epistemological nonmoral skepticism. The second is what the implications of conciliationism are for the epistemic status of particular moral beliefs. The third is whether conciliationism's impact on the epistemic status of our moral beliefs has practical implications.
-
There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy.
-
A popular argument is that peer disagreement about controversial moral topics undermines justified moral belief in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not undermine justified non-moral belief. Call this argument the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement. Jason Decker and Daniel Groll have recently made a companions in guilt response to this argument. Decker and Groll argue that if peer disagreement undermines justified moral belief, then peer disagreement undermines much non-moral justified belief; if the argument for moral skepticism from peer disagreement succeeds, then a kind of non-moral skepticism holds too. And we should not hold that the status of such non-moral beliefs are undermined by peer disagreement. In this paper, I shows that Decker and Groll’s companions in guilt argument fails. I then draw out the implications of my argument for the epistemology of disagreement and the epistemology of moral disagreement more generally. For instance, I then argue that peer disagreement about morality does not undermine all justified moral belief but that peer disagreement about morality does preclude most moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge in a way that peer disagreement about non-moral topics does not preclude most non-moral beliefs from being justified and constituting knowledge.
Moral Error Theory
-
Comparisons between morality and other 'companion' disciplines - such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics - are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the 'companions in guilt' strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a 'companion', and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge. Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.
-
Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons if facts and claims about morality entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. And, as I explain, there is a good case that facts and claims about morality do entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons.
-
Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
-
In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that they do not know everything. And it could not be the case that we do not know that there is thought when we believe that there is thought and that we do not know that we do not know everything. I address several objections to the claim that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief. It might seem that arguing against the error theory on the grounds that it entails that no one knows anything is just providing a Moorean argument against the moral error theory. I show that even if my argument against the error theory is indeed a Moorean one, it avoids Streumer's, McPherson's and Olson's objections to previous Moorean arguments against the error theory and is a more powerful argument against the error theory than Moore's argument against external world skepticism is against external world skepticism.
-
-
-
This volume is a study of connections between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and contemporary moral philosophy. Papers cover areas including the relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to contemporary ethics, such as the place of his views in relation to specific moral theories; Wittgensteinian approaches towards issues in contemporary moral philosophy; the application of Wittgensteinian views to applied ethical debates; and exegetical and critical essays on Wittgenstein’s views on ethics. Chaptersare thematically divided into six areas: (1) Wittgenstein’s views on ethics; (2) Wittgenstein and metaethics; (3) Wittgenstein and normative ethics; (4) Wittgenstein and moral epistemology; (5) Wittgensteinian approaches to applied ethical debates; and (6) Wittgenstein and the ethics of philosophy.
-
Several Wittgensteinian philosophers, including Alice Crary, Kate Manne, John McDowell, and P.F. Strawson, have defended practice-based accounts of various normative phenomena, including practical normativity, which they hold to be Wittgensteinian accounts. For instance, according to Kate Manne, ‘practical reasons (of the relevant kind) have their source in social practices, rather than objective facts about what to do, or facts about what we want as individuals … these reasons arise directly from facts about what we do, or about what one does’. These accounts are Wittgensteinian primarily in that they hold that social practices rather than something external to them (such as objective moral facts) ground practical normativity.
Practice-based views of normativity are rarely, if ever, assessed in relationship to other metaethical and metanormative views, in part because of a suspicion amongst metaethicists and metanormative theorists that they must either reduce to a form of traditional subjectivistic anti-realism or a version of traditional objectivist realism. This paper explores whether this suspicion is well-founded and how such practice-based views differ from other metaethical and metanormative views. It discusses how practice-based metanormative views relate to other metanormative views that are regarded as involving inconsistent middle-ground positions between realism and anti-realism, such as the ‘quietism’ of Derek Parfit and T.M. Scanlon, and the constructivist views of Christine Korsgaard and Sharon Street. It also discusses the arguments that can be made for such Wittgensteinian practice-based views of practical normativity and whether there are benefits to accepting such views.
The article aims to ascertain the extent to which looking to Wittgenstein can reveal genuinely distinct, under-appreciated, and under-theorized alternative views of practical normativity. It also seeks to bring these Wittgensteinian practice-based views into contact with other recently articulated alternative views of practical normativity in metaethics, with which they have not as yet been brought into contact.
-
Evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics aim to use facts about the evolutionary causes of ethical beliefs to undermine their justification. Global Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (GDAs) are arguments made in metaethics that aim to undermine the justification of all ethical beliefs. Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (LDAs) are arguments made in first-order normative ethics that aim to undermine the justification of only some of our ethical beliefs. Guy Kahane, Regina Rini, Folke Tersman, and Katia Vavova argue for skepticism about the possibility of LDAs. They argue that LDAs cannot be successful because they over-extend in a way that makes them self-undermining and yield a form of moral skepticism. In this paper I argue that this skepticism about the possibility of LDAs is misplaced.
-
This article responds to a recent empirical study by De Brigard and Weijers on intuitions about the experience machine and what it tells us about hedonism.